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1. INTRODUCTION
Lee and Nelder identify important issues and pro-
vide excellent advice and warnings associated with
inferences and interpretations for models with un-
observed, latent variables (random effects). Their
discussion of prediction versus estimation goals is
insightful and I have some sympathy with their call
for use of comprehensive probability models. They
provide a clear explanation of their h-likelihood ap-
proach and a spirited promotion of it. Unfortunately,
the value and impact of the their advice are com-
promised by their singular focus on promoting h-
likelihood. Their claim that it is an almost univer-
sally preferred approach is, to put it mildly, a stretch.
The h-likelihood approach by no means “trumps” all
competitors and has its own deficits. Over promo-
tion makes the article more of an opinion-piece than
a scientific comparison of approaches.
2. POINT/COUNTERPOINT
I identify and discuss principal points of (partial)
agreement and of disagreement. Statements by Lee
and Nelder are in italics; my responses and com-
ments are in Roman.
2.1 Modeling Strategies
Lee and Nelder write, “However, we believe that
such a choice is inappropriate because the choice of
an estimation method for a particular parameter-
ization (marginal parameter) should not pre-empt
the process of model selection.” I agree. Estimation
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methods are a means to an end and usually not,
themselves, the end (in methods research they can
be the goal). Of course, the estimation method might
influence model choice in that an inefficient method
may miss important covariates and an inappropriate
method may lead to bias. Sometimes the means/ends
distinction gets blurred. For example, several years
ago someone wrote to let me know that he thought
the EM estimate was the absolute best; far better
than the MLE!
Unified Probability Models are absolutely neces-
sary: I do take issue with this claim. One should
not discount the effectiveness of analyses and algo-
rithms that are not fully probability-based or com-
prehensive. These have and will continue to play
an important role. While a unified approach with
marginals, conditionals, etc., all generated by a joint
distribution is without question the ideal, often it
is not attainable. Data limitations, limitations in
scientific understanding and computing constraints
can thwart use of this holy grail. Even attainment
can be illusory because the unified model may not
be correct and may mislead. So, while I favor the
unified approach, I’m very comfortable with an ap-
proach that validly and effectively addresses a spe-
cific goal.
“. . . so that care is necessary in making inferences
about unobservables.” Absolutely! Extreme care and
caution are most definitely needed. Inferences on la-
tent effects are always model-based to some degree,
and some assumptions cannot be verified empiri-
cally. For example, models using the standard Pois-
son distribution as baseline rather than the more
general negative binomial will “identify” unaccounted
(extra-Poisson) variation and allocate it to a latent
effect. If a negative binomial model is used, much
of this variation will be absorbed into the baseline
model. Both approaches can produce similar predic-
tions of observable quantities, but will produce very
different inference for latent effects. All modeling ap-
proaches need to deal with such issues, and the h-
likelihood is not a panacea. In contrast, use of latent
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variable models and hierarchical models to general-
ize the mean and association structure of models
for observeds is quite safe. Therefore, I agree with
Lee and Nelder that focus on the prediction space
rather than the parameter space avoids mis- or over-
interpretation of parameter estimates.
2.2 H-likelihood and Competitors
“. . . that when applied appropriately h-likelihood
methods are both valid and efficient in such settings.”
It is most surely the case that in some settings, with
an appropriate parameterization, the h-likelihood ap-
proach is valid and efficient. However, it is not glob-
ally valid and even when it is valid may perform
no better than, and possibly worse than other ap-
proaches.
“However, GEEs cannot (generally) be integrated
to obtain a likelihood function [McCullagh and Nelder
(1989)] and therefore may not have a probabilistic or
likelihood basis.” True, but GEEs can be very effec-
tive, especially for population-targeted inferences. I
agree with Lee and Nelder that likelihood-based ap-
proaches or likelihood-like (marginal, partial, pro-
file,. . . ) approaches should be used when available
and their use is essentially necessary when making
inferences on latent effects.
“HGLMs allow a synthesis of GLMs, random-effect
models, and structured-dispersion models.” They do
synthesize, but aren’t alone in accomplishing this
task.
Bayes is like the Adjusted profile h-likelihood
(APHL). Well, that’s one way to put it. The other
way is that the APHL is like Bayes. Regarding ex-
tended Likelihood versus (empirical) Bayesian ap-
proaches, one can think of the h-likelihood as prior
augmented likelihood, an attractive approach to sta-
bilizing and smoothing MLEs. However, taking full
advantage of the structure requires moving away
from mode/curvature inferences and, at least for
some nonstandard goals, employing the fully Bayesian
formalism.
Poor performance of plug-in empirical Bayes (EB)
Yes, naive EB produces a too-low variance estimate
(more generally, an incorrect shape and association
structure), unless the estimates of prior parameters
are very precise. This observation motivated the
Laird/Louis bootstrap and Carlin and Gelfand’s
matching approach. These have been supplanted by
Bayes empirical Bayes (BEB) with a hyper-prior
from which prior parameters are sampled. BEB has
proven very effective in producing procedures with
excellent frequentist (as well as Bayesian) proper-
ties. See, for example, Table 3.4 in Carlin and Louis
(2000) and Table 5.6 in Carlin and Louis (2009).
Priors and hyper-priors Lee and Nelder state, “In
Bayesian analysis, priors can give information on
unidentifiable model assumptions, so that it is hard
to know whether the information is entirely com-
ing from the uncheckable priors.” Yes, and ditto for
modeling assumptions whatever the approach. Care
is needed.
In Section 4.3.1, Lee and Nelder criticize use of
σ−2 ∼ gamma(0.0001,0.0001). The problems with
using this prior and a gamma(α,α) more generally
are well known. Though the mean is 1 and coefficient
of variation is large, most of the prior mass is in the
interval (0,1]. It’s better to use a uniform prior on
logσ in a bounded interval with the bounds selected
to respect measurement units. It is most definitely
the case that more research is needed on selecting
hyper-priors that produce good frequentist proper-
ties. This and other examples highlight the need for
sophistication and care when exploring the latent
world.
2.3 Goals that Challenge the H-likelihood
Accounting for uncertainty Lee and Nelder make
the important point about the need to account for
uncertainty, but can’t avoid “dissing” (empirical)
Bayes. They state, “The h-likelihood approach takes
into account the uncertainty in the estimation of
random effects, so that inferences about unobserv-
ables are possible without resorting to an EB frame-
work.” The h-likelihood may take this uncertainty
into account, but it does not ensure that all rele-
vant uncertainties migrate into the inferences. For
example, it does not allow for adjusting the shape
of or association structure in the distribution of ran-
dom effects, whereas the Bayesian formalism intro-
duces both of these along expanding the spread by
integrating over the posterior hyper-prior.
Nonstandard goals Regarding goals, while the
h-likelihood and other purely likelihood-based ap-
proaches can be effective in making inferences on
measures of central tendency and linear functions
of target parameters, they have a difficult time in
structuring an approach for nonstandard goals
whereas the Bayesian formalism is successful. For
example, consider estimating the ranks of the θk in
a two-stage model, [θ1, . . . , θK ] i.i.d. G; [Yk|θk] i.n.d.
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fk(yk|θk). As detailed in Lin et al. (2006), if the θs
were observed, Rk(θ) =
∑
K
ν=0
I{θk≥θν};Pk =
Rk/(K + 2) with the smallest θ having rank 1.
Ranks/percentiles that minimize posterior expected
squared-error loss for the ranks are their posterior
mean or a discretized version,
R¯k(Y) = E[Rk(θ) |Y] =
∑
ν
pr[θk ≥ θν |Y],
Rˆk = rank(R¯); Pˆk = Rˆk/(K +1).
The model can be generalized to BEB and is effec-
tive in both Bayesian and frequentist evaluations.
Similarly challenging inferential goals are handled
well (if handled with care!) by the Bayesian formal-
ism, including proper accounting for uncertainty.
Computational challenges Lee and Nelder write,
“However, the computation of the ML estimation of
the parameters can be a complex task because of in-
tractable integration.” Yes, finding the MLE and de-
veloping appropriate inferences can can be complex,
and expansions around the mode may not be up to
the task. Markov chain Monte Carlo methods have
enabled likelihood-based and Bayesian-based anal-
yses of complex data and models. Use them, but
carefully!
Resorting to (empirical) Bayes It is strange that
Lee and Nelder characterize use of empirical Bayes
a “resort.” In this day and age is the Bayesian for-
malism to be avoided? Have the last 20–25 years
passed Lee and Nelder by? Most statisticians have
gone beyond the Bayes/frequentist polemic of the
1980s and early 1990s. Yes, there are challenges, but
use of the Bayesian formalism in both it’s objective
and informative-prior forms, burgeons. It’s use is by
no means a panacea, but carefully employed, it is
very effective in addressing both Bayesian and fre-
quentist goals.
3. SUMMARY
Lee and Nelder provide considerable food for
thought, considerable light and some heat, heat pro-
duced by their over-promotion of h-likelihood. I sup-
port Lee and Nelder’s goal of attempting a unified
analysis based on full probability modeling, but note
that the Bayesian formalism is best suited to this
task. Use of the full probability calculus, empowered
by modern computing, brings in (most) relevant un-
certainties, produces properly shaped and calibrated
confidence regions and enables addressing nonstan-
dard goals such as ranking. However, I caution that
full probability modeling isn’t always available or
valid and in many situations compromises are nec-
essary.
Whatever the approach to analysis, care, evalua-
tion, and sophistication are needed, especially when
structuring inferences for latent effects. Polemic and
over-promotion distract from the important issues
and goals. These should be replaced by aggressive
scientific evaluations and energetic discourse.
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